How to read Miliband’s Europe policy

Ed Miliband’s announcement on the EU in the Financial Times today is partly a recognition of this:

But it is also made with a keen awareness of this:

The first chart, via Ipsos Mori, shows the salience of Europe as an issue among British voters. To judge by the excitability of some Conservative MPs, one would think the details of the Lisbon treaty were the talk of pubs across the land. But listen carefully and you will not hear the cacophony of debate about the finer points of the common agricultural policy. Europe as an issue has declined in salience, and did so even before the financial crisis returned economic issues to the forefront of voters’ minds.

Why, then, would Mr Miliband want to bind himself to a referendum in a specific year on an issue that most people do not feel strongly about? It would get in the way of his most important item for the parliament – the Budget, still – and, well, he might lose. It would annoy any big business supporters the party has left.

Moreover, the Labour party believes that its commitment to a referendum if further powers were taken by Brussels is a stronger negotiating position for EU reform than the prime minister’s plan to try to renegotiate in advance of a possible referendum in 2017. Flexibility in foreign policy is a precious asset. David Cameron claims to have maintained some by not committing his vote but the real power lies with Angela Merkel. The logic of the Labour position is obvious, the stance almost inevitable.

(For those asking in the comments of Mr Miliband’s op-ed, Labour policy is different to the European Act 2011 in that there is a pledge of a full in/out referendum in the case of a new treaty rather than a pledge to hold a referendum only on the treaty itself.)

But what about the second chart? How to balance the insanity of a referendum commitment without seeming to disdain democracy has been troubling Labour strategists, as George Parker, the FT’s political Editor, writes in his article.

The graph reflects the trend that particularly worries the likes of Jon Cruddas, the head of Labour’s policy review process. Taken from Revolt on the Right, a much-discussed new book on the rise of the UK Independence party, it shows a spike since 2010 in anti-political sentiment among working-class voters. There is a another trend among young people away from established politics but this has less of a class dimension. Both are part of a longer, secular trend in post-industrial Britain away from an established political duopoly.

The immediate worry is that after stoking populism, the Labour leader becomes stuck on the wrong side of it. Ukip is a threat to Labour as well as the Conservatives, as I found when reporting last year. Eight of the 10 most winnable “Ukip-friendly” seats are held by Labour, according to Rob Ford and Matthew Goodwin, the authors of Revolt. And as this brilliantly nerdy post by @election-data suggests, these are where there are disproportionate numbers of older working class men without tertiary education. They feel left behind and they might now leave the Left behind.

Hence why, in the middle of the Miliband op-ed, there are commitments on benefits and a paragraph on immigration, as well as the vague promise of a future referendum if there were any move to future treaty changes. The Labour leader is trying to prevent the bleeding of support from his party to those on the right. Europe might not be a salient issue but in today’s populist climate, it is a symbolic one.