This is an audio transcript of the Rachman Review podcast episode: ‘How the Ukraine war reshaped US alliances’

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Gideon Rachman
Hello and welcome to the Rachman Review. I’m Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. This week, we’re focusing on America and the world. My guest is Thomas Wright, who’s director of strategic planning at the National Security Council in the Biden White House. He’s also one of the main authors of America’s recently published National Security Strategy. So with the challenges from China, Russia and climate change all intensifying, how does America see the decade ahead?

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Ever since coming to office, President Biden has argued that we’re facing a historic turning point, a global struggle between autocracy and democracy.

Joe Biden
We are in the midst of a fundamental debate about the future and direction of our world. We’re at an inflection point between those who argue that given all the challenges we face — from the fourth Industrial Revolution to the global pandemic — that autocracy is the best way forward, they argue; and those who understand that democracy is essential.

Gideon Rachman
For many in Washington, that struggle that Biden described is being waged right now in the war in Ukraine. And the recent confrontation with China over Taiwan has also raised tensions, with growing speculation that China may invade the island.

News clip
They’re not going to war, but they want the world to know they’re ready. Twenty-seven Chinese fighter jets took off for military operations near Taiwan today. The Taiwanese defence ministry said that 22 crossed the maritime border, so Taiwan scrambled its own jets in response.

Gideon Rachman
Tom Wright’s job on the National Security Council means that he’s been deeply involved in day-to-day crisis management. But as strategy director, it’s also his job to think long-term. Tom was born and raised in Ireland. He came to the US as a student and has worked his way up through universities and think-tanks before joining the National Security Council earlier this year. When I sat down with him in the White House in late October, the news was dominated by the war in Ukraine, the recent Communist party congress in China and the run-up to two crucial international meetings: the climate summit in Egypt and the G20 summit in Indonesia. I started by asking Tom Wright how he would summarise the central themes of America’s new national security strategy.

Thomas Wright
I think the central idea for us is the notion that as we look at trying to, you know, achieve a world that’s free and open and prosperous and secure, that the United States and our allies and partners face two challenges. One is strategic competition with major powers like China and Russia, and the other are challenges that we share in common, like climate change, pandemics, global economic volatility. And that is not just a question of doing both. Obviously, we need to do both. But we also need to understand how each affects the other. You know, we can’t really succeed in this strategic competition unless we have an affirmative plan to engage countries in some of these issues on their own terms. And we can’t co-operate on those shared challenges unless we understand what’s happening geopolitically and that the world is becoming more competitive and we need sort of a different approach. And so the United States and other countries will be dealing with these two separate lines of challenges for many years to come. And so we hope that this document really provides a bit of a road map.

Gideon Rachman
How do you confront China where you need to but also work with them on climate change? I wasn’t clear by the time I’d finished the document. I don’t think there can be a clear answer.

Thomas Wright
Well, I think there is an answer to it. And the answer is sort of twofold. One, we compete vigorously with China. We can talk more about that and how that is done. I think we laid that out in the document. But the other is, as we look at co-operating in these shared challenges, that we have sort of a two-track approach. On one track, we say we’re willing to work with all countries, including China, on shared challenges, but we recognise that will be very difficult. And the other track is to massively deepen co-operation with like-minded countries, particularly democracies, on a wide array of these shared challenges. And we’ve seen, I think, a lot of that in the last couple of years. And so the answer, Gideon, I think, really is not to put all our eggs in the basket of co-operating with China or with other competitors. We should be open to that. We should do that if it serves the national interest and in a way that is sort of mutually beneficial. But we shouldn’t assume that that will be automatic or easy or even hugely fruitful. And so we need to really look at alternative ways of generating co-operation, and that’s where we get into like-minded space. So I agree that there’s a tension. I think we’re trying to move beyond saying just compete where there’s differences and co-operate in other things. I mean, that would be great, but I think it’s a lot more complicated than that.

Gideon Rachman
So is it more like you’re trying to create a grouping of like-minded countries that’s so powerful that it creates the global environment and sort of drags the rest of the world along?

Thomas Wright
Well, I don’t think it’s a single grouping. I think we do want to work with democratic countries and other like-minded countries to shape the rules of the road and technology and economics. And I know there are issues and that might create this sort of external environment that upholds our shared interests and shared values. But then I think there’s a lot of different initiatives and endeavours to try to generate co-operation among smaller number of countries. You know, now we have the US-EU Trade and Technology Council. There are other tech dialogues with other sort of countries and actors. There’s the work in the Quad. There’s the revitalisation of the G7. There’s the India-Israel-US-UAE initiative that was launched over the summer. So there’s multiple ways of doing this. In the document, it’s called sort of a latticework of co-operation, sort of overlapping efforts. And so it’s not just a one sort of coalition approach. I think it’s finding ways to have as transformative co-operation as possible, again, amongst those like-minded countries. And, you know, that is part of competing as well. But it won’t always be defined in a reactive way because what we have to do is sort of set out an affirmative agenda of the type of world we wanna see and then run our race of trying to do that rather than all of us seeing it through the lens of everything is sort of a reactive, zero-sum competition with another country.

Gideon Rachman
But there is, as you indicated. I mean a very clear statement in the document that China is now, I think you say, the primary geopolitical challenge facing the United States. Why is that? What’s the problem?

Thomas Wright
Yeah, I think, well, we say a couple of things. One is the most consequential . . . 

Gideon Rachman
Consequential, yeah.

Thomas Wright
Geopolitical challenge the United States faces. Another related line is that China is the only competitor with the intent and increasingly, the capability to fundamentally challenge the international order and to reshape it in line with its own objectives. And I think that’s sort of self-evidently true. You know, Russia poses a very immediate threat in Europe. It’s obviously waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, but it lacks those sort of across-the-spectrum economic and technological capabilities that will give it the ability to have an enduring challenge to the international order over time. So I think China is, you know, in a separate category of its own. And I think as we describe in the document, they have a vision for how the world should evolve that’s very different to ours. And it’s on rules of the road for things like technology and, you know, economics. It’s on the role of spheres of influence and its ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. It’s on how international institutions and international law should be shaped. And so I think all of these things add up to a vision that’s quite different than ours. And so we are trying to, I think, compete with them in multiple different ways. And one of those is to have a very affirmative vision of our own and to build the strongest possible set of coalitions to advance that. Another is to invest in strengths at home, particularly on the innovation base and technology. And another is to strengthen and modernise the military so it’s prepared for an era of strategic competition. So there’s a variety of ways to do that, which I think we lay out in the document.

Gideon Rachman
Is this the clearest statement yet though from the United States that . . . You say in the document, this isn’t a new cold war and you don’t have an intention of starting one, but that you are now in a broad-based strategic rivalry with China with no immediate prospect of that going away.

Thomas Wright
Well, I think what we describe in that regard is that there is a competition to shape where the world goes next. We say in the document, I think that the post-cold war era is definitively over. And what we mean by that is obviously that’s been said before with 9/11 or the financial crisis. But I think what’s different on this occasion is that in those instances the world really changed, but actually the major powers remained relatively aligned. There are now some very significant divergences, and I think that is something that is not going to revert back to the way it was. And so we, I think, are recognising that there is at multiple different levels, more competitive elements to world politics and we’re saying that in some respects we will have to outcompete China and others in terms of advancing our vision. But we do also say the other piece of it is that as we do that, we need to be serious about engaging these shared challenges and make progress on those. And we can do that partly domestically, as we saw with the recent action on climate change. We can do that, you know, working with like-minded countries and also reaching out if there are areas where we can co-operate with competitors. And so there is a variety of ways to do that as well.

Gideon Rachman
But on the competitive bits, what in the end is driving it? Do you think it’s that China under Xi, it’s become just much more apparent that they intend to become the world’s dominant power and that they have a different view of the liberal order, or that there shouldn’t really be a liberal order?

Thomas Wright
Yeah, I think there’s probably a number of underlying factors to do with trends and the balance of power over time. Obviously, China’s rise over many years has put it in the position, you know, where it has some of the capability to do this. But intent, I think, is obviously also very important in the document. And this really reflects, obviously, what the president has spoken about on many occasions. I think there is a part of this that has to do with governance systems. And so he’s spoken about how democracy is in a competition — meritocracy — partly to see which system can deliver best for its own people, but partly because each system has a different vision of how the world should go. And in the document, we really try to give additional detail, I think, on how that’s sort of operationalised here and how that translates into policy. And we say, and I think this is an important detail in the concept, that really the challenge we face is from a layering of authoritarian government with the revisionist foreign policy, and that includes behaviours like waging or preparing for wars of aggression, using technology and economics for coercive purposes, particularly against smaller countries exporting in a liberal model of order or undermining democratic processes elsewhere . . . 

Gideon Rachman
So that was the key concept.

Thomas Wright
Yeah.

Gideon Rachman
This is the combination of authoritarianism and international revisionism, and that’s where it comes together and you feel, OK, we’ve got to do something about that.

Thomas Wright
Yeah. Yeah.

Gideon Rachman
And there’s a very striking phrase in the document, which I think also the national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, has used in a speech as well, about the G7 being the steering committee of the free world. And one of the reasons that struck me is that we’re speaking just a couple of weeks ahead of the G20. So does that imply a sort of downgrading of the G20? And it’s really the G7 you’re looking to us as the most useful group?

Thomas Wright
Well, I think the president has spoken repeatedly, obviously, about wanting to build a common position with other democracies. And, you know, democracies have certain things in common. And from the moment he took office, if I recall correctly, I think the first major summit was a G7 summit. But certainly the G7 was a strong emphasis early on, and I think we sort of see that as somewhat revitalised and reprioritised. You know, it was pretty dormant obviously in 2020 during the pandemic and in the previous administration, but even previously the G20 had sort of been elevated beyond it. I think we do see the G7 as having a real relevance, and I think there’s ways of giving it sort of additional influence, including by inviting other countries, as has happened last year and many years, to participate. So it’s not just the original group of seven. I’ll get to the G20 in a second, but you know, there is a line in the document that talks about growing the connective tissue between alliances in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific, and this is one way to do that. You know, Aukus is another way to do it.

Gideon Rachman
Aukus is the Australia-UK-US treaty.

Thomas Wright
Yeah, but this is a larger obviously overarching organisation, the G7 plus additional countries that are invited to participate. That’s a way of trying to knit sort of Europe and the Indo-Pacific more closely together. I think the G20 that still has an important role to play. But you know, there are obviously striking differences amongst G20 countries. And Russia’s a part of the G20. There are divisions there, I think, amongst the members.

Gideon Rachman
And you can’t imagine the G20 coming out with a communique of common interest if Putin is there and maybe even if he isn’t?

Thomas Wright
Well, I think it’s an important moment, actually. I hope we’ll see G20 countries in resounding numbers making clear the importance of upholding the UN Charter and upholding the values that all countries, including Russia, have signed up to. So I do hope we will see that.

Gideon Rachman
I do expect it because I guess one of the interesting things about this whole Ukraine crisis has been the slightly equivocal position of the Global South, as it’s called. And a lot of those countries will be there: the Brazils, Argentinas, Indias, Indonesia’s the host. I mean, none of them approve of the invasion, but they certainly haven’t taken the strongly condemnatory line of the West led by the US.

Thomas Wright
Yeah, I think there are differences in approach for sure that we’ve seen, and I think different countries also have different interests on this. For some, you know, food security hit pretty hard earlier in the year. That’s something we obviously all worked on. And there is a grain deal now that I think addresses some of those. But I think all countries want to varying degrees, you know, of urgency would want the war to end because it’s obviously very destructive. I think our position, and allies’ and partners’ obviously, is that it needs to end in a manner consistent with the UN charter and with a free and independent Ukraine. I do think, too, though, that as all of that goes on, there are some moments that I think do demonstrate the overwhelming character of the response to the invasion. So the recent UN General Assembly resolution of annexation, for instance, which I think about 143 votes, exceeded the original UNGA resolution condemning the invasion, which was 141. I thought that was extraordinary, the number actually went up. And I think it shows that in general terms, countries have different positions, but when it comes down to putting on the record at the United Nations, the position on something like annexation — there is a very clear message. And I think Russia should hear that because if it thinks that the world is prevaricating or, you know, maybe sort of on its side on some of this, I do not think that’s true at all. I think there is some anxiety about the conflict and wanting to deal with the effects of that. But that’s very, very different, I think, than any type of acquiescence in what they are doing or have done. And I think it’s because countries agree that what we’re talking about here is fundamental principles, not of some abstract US-led international order, but actually of the UN charter, which, as the president said in New York in September, every country, including countries that aren’t democratic, signed up to — including Russia.

Gideon Rachman
I mean, I did wonder, how do you sit around writing a long-term strategy for the United States, which I think every administration is compelled to do?

Thomas Wright
Yeah, by law. Yeah, yeah.

Gideon Rachman
In the middle of this massive international crisis. Because, you know, couldn’t you just have to say, look, it so much depends on how this turns out.

Thomas Wright
Well, we did delay it a little bit at the beginning of the war for precisely this reason, because I think we were looking at a release sort of earlier this year, and it felt sort of prudent to wait to see. Obviously, the administration warned about a pending invasion, but it made sense, I think, to wait to see if that happened, because I think that does need to be factored into the strategy in the same way, obviously, that previous administrations, the second term of Obama, had to deal with: the rise of crisis in the Middle East, George W Bush obviously the 9/11. So I think it is one of those major events and I think it will affect obviously the longer-term strategy. But I think there are things that we can say even about Russia now that will be sort of guiding principles for Russia policy such as strong support for Ukraine, for NATO, a determination to make sure that Russia can’t . . . that its aggression can’t succeed, that it can’t use nuclear weapons and achieve a strategic benefit from them. And that while all of this goes on, we will be willing to maintain channels with Russia to talk about strategic issues to do with the broader stability and managing nuclear risk.

Gideon Rachman
And you say managing nuclear risk. I mean, obviously not something you could discuss in a long-term report, but how much is that at the centre of your work right now?

Thomas Wright
Well, I think we’ve obviously been concerned by Russia’s rhetoric around nuclear weapons and also by its actions in Ukraine. And I think the national security adviser has talked publicly about the consequences if Russia is to go in that direction. And we’ve also acknowledged, I think, that we have messaged that directly to the Russian government. So it is something we’re concerned about, but I think, you know, we’re also concerned about the broader effects of the war in Ukraine itself. And, you know, I think there is a way for it to end pretty quickly, which is Russia can choose to stop its aggression in Ukraine.

Gideon Rachman
But no sign they’re gonna do that.

Thomas Wright
I mean, certainly what we’ve seen with annexation and with mobilisation would suggest that Vladimir Putin has not fundamentally changed his approach. And so our approach is to support Ukraine and assist Ukraine so that they can achieve a free and independent and democratic Ukraine with the capacity to defend itself from the future and deter against future attack. We’ve set that, and we’ve also set — the president was very clear on this, I think, in his op-ed over the summer, that we are also in favour of a negotiated settlement that achieves that objective — that any negotiated settlement would have to be consistent with the UN charter.

Gideon Rachman
Back to the report. I mean, there’s been a longstanding debate over the years about where should America place its chips internationally, colloquially. I mean, is it the Middle East? Should you pivot to Asia? I thought one of the things that’s striking about the report is you more or less say all these problems are interconnected. I think you write at some point that a destabilisation of the world order in Asia would destabilise Europe and vice versa. So really, are you seeing it sort of coming together of all these global trouble spots into a sort of single challenge?

Thomas Wright
Yeah, I mean, I think we do talk a bit about that for sure. And I think the logic there is that the notion that you can have very clean pivot, especially from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, and just leave Europe to European countries to deal with and pivot forces very dramatically to the Indo-Pacific and that that is something that would not have any sort of negative consequences. I think we reject that for a few reasons. One is that the destabilisation of the order, particularly in, I think the Indo-Pacific or Europe, would have hugely global consequences. I think it’s also true more generally, but I think particularly in those two regions. And so it’s hard to see how, for instance, if Vladimir Putin were to have won the war in Ukraine and we had been less involved because we had said, well, we need to just focus in the Indo-Pacific.

Gideon Rachman
And there are people in this town who make that argument.

Thomas Wright
There are people. Would that advance our objectives in the Indo-Pacific? We don’t think it would. And the same is true, I think, in reverse. I would also say, and we say this in the document, that you know the US obviously has global interests and has allies and partners all around the world and that those alliances and partnerships are a strategic asset for this shared vision of a free and open and prosperous and secure world. And to the extent that those allies and partners are actively engaged in advancing and upholding that vision globally — that is beneficial. And so it’s good that European countries take an interest in the Indo-Pacific and are engaged with democracies in the Indo-Pacific and are working with us on China policy and obviously have their own interests and China policy that they are pursuing. And then it’s very beneficial I think that Japan and South Korea and Australia and others have been very active on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and have pushed back against it. Prime minister of Japan and the prime minister of Australia, for instance, have been very vocal in the importance of maintaining a nuclear weapons use, maintaining the non-use of those weapons in the context of this war. And so I think that was very beneficial. So I think when we talk about it in sort of zero-sum terms, I think it misses something really important. And so we try to capture that in the national security strategy as well. And I think it very much reflects the President’s worldview. I mean, he is obviously deeply committed to the transatlantic alliance and relationship, but also, you know, has been very committed to America’s alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

Gideon Rachman
One thing that I think is in your strategy and it’s actually, you know, having read the British strategy, strong emphasis on technology as . . . 

Thomas Wright
Yeah.

Gideon Rachman
The decider for the 21st century. Do you feel that there are things to be done to ensure that America retains its, I guess, traditional lead in cutting-edge technologies? Or to put it another way, were you in danger or are you in danger of losing that?

Thomas Wright
Yeah. And actually, I probably should have mentioned this in the beginning when you asked me about the overarching frame, but we opened the document by saying we’re in the early years of a decisive decade, and we define that by saying that what that really means is not just that the times are consequential, even though they are, but the choices we make now will have outsized effects in future years. So on foundational technologies, the investments made today will really create dependencies on, you know, who has an advantage on those technologies. And the same is true, which matter profoundly on the competition, but also on shared challenges like pandemic preparedness and climate. The same is true. We have a closing window of opportunity to deal with those. I think technology or these foundational technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum and biotechnology and that general grouping — those are ones where I think there’s a very strong emphasis on the document about the importance of making smart investments domestically. And I think this is really an area where you see bipartisan support, like for the Chips Act on semiconductors and for a new, more targeted and focused industrial policy. And that’s important because China in particular is not just playing by the regular rules of the market. And so we’re not dealing with sort of a fair and level playing field. And in order to ensure that they don’t get an unfairly acquired edge on this, we do need to be smart and focused and disciplined about investing in those strengths domestically and then working with other countries too on that, but also on the supply chain resilience and a shared approach to some of these technologies and then a shaping of the rules of the road. So it’s a theme throughout. I mean, there are lengthy sections in technology, but it’s also just in every section because I think it is really a key sort of area of focus in this broader competition.

Gideon Rachman
And a final question. I don’t know whether it’s something you can really answer, but I do wonder what it’s like being you? I mean, in the sense that you were an academic, and I think one of the strengths of the American system is they bring people from outside into the White House and so on. But you’ve been working on these issues in the way professors do, or maybe, maybe even I do, you know, writing about them in theory. But suddenly it’s your responsibility. What’s it feel like to be at the heart of it?

Thomas Wright
It’s not as easy writing in government as it is externally. I now feel that the most strenuous editors I had were lighter than . . . But no, I mean, in seriousness, I think national security strategy is something that’s produced by the president and by the White House. But also there’s a very robust sort of inter-agency approach, which means that you would discuss it and get input from all of the different departments and agencies in the administration. So not just, you know, the Department of Defence and the State Department, but also USAID and the Department of Commerce and the Department of Treasury. And so I think the part I guess, to answer your question, that’s different is not just that we’re writing on the official policy of the US government, but also that it needs to reflect that inter-agency approach. And it also needs to be an accurate reflection of the president’s worldview, because if it’s not that, then it’s just sort of an interesting essay. We really tried to make sure that this document was sort of an accurate reflection of, first and foremost, the president, but then obviously the broader administration as well.

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Gideon Rachman
That was Thomas Wright of the Biden administration ending this edition of the Rachman Review, I’ll be away for the next two weeks, but the show goes on so please tune in again next week.

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